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CASE COMMENTS
AGENcY-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR AcTs OF INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR.-An independent contractor, while delivering gasoline
sold by D oil company, overflowed a tank situated in the same
building with a coal stove, causing an explosion which injured P.
Held, that the handling of gasoline was not an intrinsically danger-
ous undertaking nor was the injury a direct foreseeable consequence
of the work engaged in by the independent contractor, so as to
fall within exceptions to the general rule which absolve an em-
ployer from liability for injuries arising from work let to an
independent contractor. Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, 76
S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1953).
The court reasoned that the handling of gasoline was not
intrinsically dangerous in so far as it could have been done safely
had it been handled in a careful manner and also felt that the
consequences could not have been reasonably anticipated to result
directly from performance of the work.
It will be well to note that the ground upon which P seeks to
impose liability upon the employer, by virtue of the work being
intrinsically dangerous, is altogether a separate question from
whether liability may attach to an employer on the basis that the
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injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the work. It is
not only clear under past decisions that both grounds will impose
liability upon an employer for work done by an independent
contractor, but that they exist as separate and distinct doctrines.
Trump v. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co., 99 W. Va.
425, 129 S.E. 309 (1925); Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va.
323 (1882). Though the doctrines are closely related and somewhat
overlapping, there could arise situations in which a particular
undertaking could be of such character that injury to third persons
could result directly from its performance if reasonable care were
omitted and yet the work would not be intrinsically dangerous.
This is illustrated by McNulty v. Ludwig, 153 App. Div. 206, 138
N.Y. Supp. 84 (1912), where the claimant was allowed to recover
on the ground that the injury resulted directly from the work in
which the independent contractor was engaged, after it had been
adjudged on a previous appeal that he was not entitled to recover
on the ground that the work was intrinsically dangerous, 121 App.
Div. 912, 109 N.Y. Supp. 703 (1908).
The question here to be considered, however, is when will the
West Virginia court classify a particular undertaking as intrinsically
dangerous so as to impose liability upon an employer? Before
examining the interpretation in the instant case, it would first be
well to attempt some general definition of the phrase "intrinsically
dangerous undertaking." Words expressive of this phrase are com-
monly found to the effect that it means "work necessarily attended
with danger, however skillfully performed." Jefferson v. Chapman,
127 Ill. 438, 20 N.E. 33 (1889). Or, to elaborate negatively, works
which are only "attended with great danger if carelessly managed,
although with proper care they are not specially hazardous," do
no fall within this phrase. Laffery v. United States Gypsum Co.,
83 Kan. 349, 111 Pac. 498 (1910).
The court in the present case impliedly adopts this definition
by excluding the applicability of the doctrine on the ground that
the work could have been done safely had due care been used.
The court, nevertheless, in a prior case held that the digging of a
ditch across a public street by an independent contractor was so
intrinsically dangerous as to impose liability upon the employer.
Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323 (1882). This case
appears to be inconsistent with the instant case in the application
of the doctrine since it would seem that the digging of a ditch
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could be more readily done with safety than could the handling
of gasoline. The court's opinion in the Wilson case, however,
hints that liability was perhaps imposed on the City of Wheeling,
as the employer, by virtue of a non-delegable duty of a municipal
corporation to keep the public streets in repair. At least it would
seem so, since the court, before considering whether the work was
intrinsically dangerous, dwelt at considerable length on the propo-
sition that an employer is not absolved from liability for the
negligent performance of a non-delegable duty which has been let
to an independent contractor. The court had little trouble in
finding that the work of building and maintaining public streets
was a non-delegable duty, quoting 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 791 (2d ed. 1873), to the effect that this duty to maintain
public streets "can not be evaded, suspended, or cast upon others
by an act of its (the city's) own." It is well settled that such a duty
is another exception to the general rule exempting an employer
from liability for work done by an independent contractor. Vickers
v. Kanawha & West Virginia R.R., 64 W. Va. 474, 63 S.E. 367
(1908).
In apparently the only other case in this jurisdiction which
turned upon the intrinsically dangerous exception, it was held that
dynamite blasting operations were so classified. Walton v. Cherokee
Colliery Co., 70 W. Va. 48, 73 S.E. 63 (1911). The court did not
elaborate; yet it is not surprising that the use of dynamite is
classified as intrinsically dangerous.
In view of the cases mentioned in which the court has been
called upon to decide just what work will qualify as intrinsically
dangerous, it would seem that the court in the instant case could
have either excluded or included the handling of gasoline as
intrinsically dangerous without any breach of the stare decisis
doctrine.
Since by definition of the phrase, the test is whether the work
can be done safely if due care is used, it is apparent that any
attempt to classify a given undertaking as intrinsically dangerous
may be quite speculative. Apparently for this reason the court
will not find a work which has been let to an independent con-
tractor to be intrinsically dangerous so as to impose liability upon
the employer except in fairly extreme cases, but there may be an
implication that less will suffice if there is also present some other
exception to the independent contractor rule which in itself would
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impose liability upon the employer, as was present in the Wilson
case. On this basis the exclusion of the handling of gasoline as an
intrinsically dangerous undertaking in the instant case seems
justified in view of the fact that no other applicable exception to
the independent contractor rule existed.
C. B. F.
CONTRACTS - REMOVAL OF TIMBER - FAILURE SEASONABLY TO
EXERCISE OPTION.-P was the assignee of a contract of sale of the
standing timber on D's land. The contract provided that P was
to have five years in which to cut and remove the timber with the
right to extend such time, from year to year, not exceeding an addi-
tional five years upon payment to D of the sum of $75.00 per year
for each annual extension. P did not remove the timber within
the time allotted and tendered payment for one of the additional
years two and one-half months after the beginning of the period.
D refused payment, contending that title to the timber had reverted
to him. Held, that a defeasible fee was created in the timber
with an option to extend the period for removal, and the belated
payment was properly refused. Sun Lumber Co. v. Thompson
Land & Coal Co., 76 S.E. 2d 105 (W. Va. 1953) (3-2 decision). The
dissent maintains that P had vested property rights in the timber,
and that equity will not permit forfeiture of a valuable property
right without intervening.
A provision regarding payment for extension privileges in a
timber contract is not a covenant but a condition, because it is
optional with the purchaser whether or not the extension privilege
will be exercised. Hall v. Ritter Lumber Co., 167 Va. 95, 187 S.E.
503 (1936). Under this type of contract the absolute title to the
timber never passes out of the seller until the purchaser cuts and
removes the timber within the period allowed by the contract.
There is no forfeiture of the title to the timber remaining uncut
or unremoved after the time limit because there is nothing to
forfeit. Lange & Crist Box & Lumber Co. v. Haught, 132 W. Va.
530, 52 S.E.2d 695 (1949). The condition spoken of in the Hall
case is a condition precedent and until it is performed P has no
property interest in the timber. Curtis v. Peebles, 160 Va. 735,
169 S.E. 548 (1933). So when the dissent speaks of P's "property
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